The first post-quantum DKIM checker (ML-DSA-44)
DKIM2 adds ML-DSA-44 keys against quantum computers, but the DKIM checkers in use validate only RSA and Ed25519 keys. Therefore DmarcDkim.com built the first DKIM checker for ML-DSA-44 keys, and a reference key is public for tests.
DKIM checkers validate RSA keys, and some also validate Ed25519 keys. None of the public checkers tested in November 2026 validates ML-DSA-44, the post-quantum key type of DKIM2. The DmarcDkim.com DKIM checker is the first that accepts k=mldsa44. It checks the key and shows its algorithm and length.
Why DKIM gets a new key type
A DKIM signature proves that a domain sent a message. Today that proof rests on RSA or Ed25519. Both hold against classical computers, and both fall to Shor's algorithm on a large quantum computer. Such a machine does not exist today. When it does, an attacker can compute the private key from the public key in DNS and sign mail as the domain.
NIST published ML-DSA as the standard FIPS 204 in August 2024. It is a lattice-based signature scheme with no known quantum attack, and ML-DSA-44 is its smallest parameter set. NIST's transition plan, IR 8547, became final in October 2026. It disallows today's quantum-vulnerable signature algorithms under NIST standards after 2035.
The DKIM working group of the IETF chose ML-DSA-44 for DKIM2, the successor of DKIM. The DKIM2 DNS draft names the key type mldsa44. Revision 03, dated November 2, 2026 on the IETF datatracker, carries this name. Revisions 01 and 02 described a combined ML-DSA-44 and Ed25519 key. The drafts are not final, so the name and the encoding can still change.
What an ML-DSA-44 DKIM record looks like
The record has the same tags as an RSA record. Only the k= value and the size of the key differ.
pq._domainkey.example.com. IN TXT "v=DKIM1; k=mldsa44; p=<1752 Base64 characters>"
The draft sets three rules for the key:
k=ismldsa44, in lower case and with no separators.p=is the raw public key of 1312 bytes, in Base64. It has no SubjectPublicKeyInfo wrapper, the same rule as for Ed25519.A key of another length is malformed.
The version tag stays v=DKIM1, also for a key that only DKIM2 uses. DKIM2 reads its keys from the same DNS records as DKIM. The draft recommends the tag, and it tells a verifier to discard a key record that starts with another version, such as v=DKIM2. The part of DKIM2 without a version number is the DKIM2-Signature header of the message, not the key record.
The price of quantum resistance is size.
| Key type | Public key | p= length | Signature |
|---|---|---|---|
RSA 2048 |
294 bytes |
392 characters |
256 bytes |
Ed25519 |
32 bytes |
44 characters |
64 bytes |
ML-DSA-44 |
1312 bytes |
1752 characters |
2420 bytes |
The whole record is 1774 characters long. A TXT string holds at most 255 bytes, so the record goes into DNS as one TXT record made of 7 strings. The signature grows too. The DKIM2 draft counts 3228 characters for one ML-DSA-44 signature in the message header, and DKIM2 adds a signature at each hop.
The answer no longer fits into one UDP packet
A resolver asks for a DNS record over UDP first, and today it offers a buffer of 1232 bytes by default. The answer for an ML-DSA-44 key is about 1900 bytes. The server sets the truncation flag, and the resolver asks again over TCP. This is what dig prints for the reference key below:
;; Truncated, retrying in TCP mode.
A deliverability researcher measured the same for a test key of their own in November 2026. An RSA or Ed25519 record usually fits into one UDP answer, so a DKIM lookup rarely needed TCP until now.
Three things follow:
DNS over TCP must work. A firewall or a resolver setup that allows only UDP on port 53 fails the lookup with no clear error. DKIM2 treats a failed key lookup as a temporary error, so the mail is delayed, not verified.
The DNS provider must accept the record. Some providers refuse a TXT record of this length, and some split it at the wrong place. Read the record back from DNS after saving it.
The strings join with nothing in between. A verifier puts the 7 strings together as they are. A space or a line break added between two strings breaks the key.
What other DKIM checkers report for an ML-DSA-44 key
Seven well-known public DKIM checkers returned a result for the reference key below in November 2026. None of them reported the correct record as valid.
Three reject the key type. They name
rsaanded25519as the only allowed values ofk=, and one of them also measures the key as an RSA key.One allows only
rsaas a key type, and then fails to read the key as RSA.One accepts the syntax of the record and marks the key as an invalid RSA key.
Two report that no DKIM record exists at the name.
These checkers follow RFC 6376 and RFC 8463, which define two key types. That is correct for DKIM as it works today. DKIM2 adds a third key type.
The opposite mistake is silent. OpenSSL exports a public key with a wrapper of 22 bytes by default, which gives 1334 bytes. A checker that looks only at the k= tag accepts that record. A verifier does not.
What the DmarcDkim.com DKIM checker validates
The DKIM checker validates RSA, Ed25519 and ML-DSA-44 keys. For an ML-DSA-44 record it does the following:
Accepts
k=mldsa44as a key type.Decodes
p=and confirms that the key is 1312 bytes long.Reports a key of another length as an error.
Names the SubjectPublicKeyInfo wrapper in an error of its own, and marks the wrapper at the start of
p=in the raw record.Shows the algorithm as ML-DSA-44 and the key length as 10496 bits.
Reports
k=mldsa44-ed25519-sha512, the key type of the older draft revisions, with a message that namesmldsa44as its replacement.Applies the same record checks as for RSA, such as more than one TXT record at the selector, a revoked key, whitespace in the key and unknown tags.
The length is the whole key check, and that is correct. An ML-DSA-44 public key is a 32-byte seed and 1024 packed numbers of 10 bits, and each bit pattern is allowed. A string of 1312 bytes is therefore a well-formed key. RSA and Ed25519 need more. An RSA key must parse as DER, and an Ed25519 key must be a point on the curve.
Generate an ML-DSA-44 DKIM key
OpenSSL supports ML-DSA from version 3.5. Check the version first.
openssl version
1. Generate the private key. Keep this file secret.
openssl genpkey -algorithm ML-DSA-44 -out mldsa44-private.pem
2. Export the public key as raw bytes in Base64. tail -c 1312 drops the 22-byte wrapper.
openssl pkey -in mldsa44-private.pem -pubout -outform DER | tail -c 1312 | openssl base64 -A
3. Confirm the length. The output must be 1752 characters long.
4. Build the record value.
v=DKIM1; k=mldsa44; p=<output of step 2>
5. Split the value. Paste it into the DNS record splitter. The result is 7 quoted strings.
6. Publish it as one TXT record at a new selector, for example pq._domainkey.example.com. Leave the RSA or Ed25519 selector as it is.
7. Check the selector. Enter pq._domainkey.example.com in the DKIM checker. It must show ML-DSA-44 and 10496 bits.
Split and check the record before it goes into DNS
Some DNS providers split a long value on their own. Others expect quoted strings of at most 255 bytes, for example in a BIND zone file. The DNS record splitter does the split and checks the key in one step:
Splits the value into 7 quoted strings, ready to paste.
Recognizes the value as a DKIM key and shows the algorithm, ML-DSA-44, and the length, 10496 bits.
Marks the key as valid or invalid before it is published. A wrapped key of 1334 bytes shows as invalid here, with an error that names the wrapper, not after a verifier rejects it.
Warns about line breaks and other control characters, which a pasted key often carries.
Accepts a value that is already split, joins it and splits it again at the right places.
A public key to test against
DmarcDkim.com publishes an ML-DSA-44 key at this name:
mldsa44._domainkey.dmarcdkim.com
It is a reference point for everyone who builds a DKIM checker or a DKIM2 verifier. No mail is signed with it. A correct tool returns these results:
| Check | Expected result |
|---|---|
TXT records at the name |
1 |
Quoted parts of the TXT record, each at most 255 bytes |
7 |
Algorithm |
ML-DSA-44 |
Decoded key length |
1312 bytes (10496 bits) |
Record status |
valid |
A tool that reports an invalid key type, or broken RSA key data, does not support post-quantum DKIM yet.
What an ML-DSA-44 key does not do yet
It is for DKIM2 only. The DNS draft defines the key type for DKIM2 and leaves its use with DKIM1 undefined. Mail signed with DKIM as it works today cannot use the key.
It adds no quantum protection next to a classical key. DKIM2 lets a signer offer several signatures as alternatives, and the message passes when one of them passes. A forger who breaks RSA or Ed25519 passes with that signature alone. The protection starts when the domain stops signing with the classical keys, or when receivers can require the post-quantum signature. A signal for that does not exist yet.
Verifier support is at the start. The DNS draft requires a DKIM2 verifier to support all three key types, but DKIM2 itself is still a draft. The large mailbox providers have not announced ML-DSA-44 verification. Keep an RSA or Ed25519 key and keep signing with it.
The draft can change. The key type had another name two revisions ago. A published key may need a new record when the draft moves again.
ML-DSA-44 is the smallest parameter set. Some national security agencies ask for larger sets or for hybrid signatures where a signature must hold for years. A DKIM signature must hold for days, which is why the small set fits here.
Get ready, do not switch yet
A published ML-DSA-44 key does not make a domain quantum safe. It makes the domain ready for the day verifiers ask for it. Three rules follow:
Learn the record now. The format is
k=mldsa44and a raw key of 1312 bytes. The known mistakes are the wrapped key and a split at the wrong place.Test DNS before the key matters. Publish a test selector, read it back, and confirm that the lookup works over TCP from the mail servers that will need it.
Keep the classical keys. RSA and Ed25519 carry the mail until receivers verify DKIM2.
Check a selector with the DKIM checker, split a long key with the DNS record splitter, see which selectors a domain really signs with in DKIM X-ray, and confirm the whole setup with the free DMARC check.
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